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Abstract. A challenge to Kant’s less known duty of self-knowledge comes from his own firm view that it 
is impossible to know oneself. This paper resolves this problem by considering the duty of self-knowledge 
as involving the pursuit of knowledge of oneself as one appears in the empirical world. First, I argue that, 
although Kant places severe restrictions on the possibility of knowing oneself as one is, he admits the pos-
sibility of knowing oneself as one appears using methods from empirical anthropology. Second, I show that 
empirical knowledge of oneself is fairly reliable and is, in fact, considered as morally significant from Kant’s 
moral anthropological perspective. Taking these points together, I conclude that Kant’s duty of self-knowledge 
exclusively entails the pursuit of empirical self-knowledge.
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Pareiga pažinti save kaip empirinį individą:  
atsakymas Kanto moralinės savižinos problemai
Santrauka. Mažiau dėmesio sulaukusiai Kanto savižinos pareigai iššūkį meta paties filosofo tvirtas įsitikinimas, 
jog žmogus savęs pažinti negali. Šiame straipsnyje ši problema išsprendžiama traktuojant savižinos pareigą 
kaip tokią, kur žinojimo apie save siekiama save suprantant kaip empiriniame pasaulyje pasireiškiantį žmogų. 
Pirmiausia teigiama, kad nors Kantas stipriai apriboja galimybę žmogui pažinti save tokį, koks jis yra, filosofas 
pripažįsta esant galimybę žmogui, naudojantis empirinės antropologijos metodais, pažinti save tokį, koks jis 
pasireiškia. Antra, straipsnyje parodoma, kad empirinė savižina yra pakankamai patikima ir netgi laikytina 
morališkai reikšminga remiantis Kanto moralinės antropologijos požiūriu. Sujungiant abu šiuos punktus, 
straipsnyje daroma išvada, jog Kanto savižinos pareiga reiškia ne daugiau negu empirinės savižinos paieškas.
Pagrindiniai žodžiai: Kantas, savižina, empirinė antropologija, moralinė pareiga
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Kant claims that the moral worth of an action depends on whether the underlying 
intention is solely to do the right action and not on whether the action gives good results 
(GMS, AA 4: 399-400). Given this emphasis on internal deliberation and motivation, it is 
not surprising to come across the moral duty to know oneself as a part of Kant’s taxonomy 
of duties. In fact, we see Kant placing a special emphasis on the pursuit of self-knowledge 
as a foundational duty to all the other moral duties that one must perform for oneself. Yet, 
the main challenge to this duty comes from Kant’s own stance on the limits of epistemic 
access that one can have into oneself. Despite stressing on the primacy of the duty to 
know oneself, Kant consistently maintains that the knowledge of oneself as one is in the 
practical realm is impossible to be attained. Commentators of Kant have paid relatively 
less attention to the contradiction in simultaneously arguing for the duty to know oneself 
and the impossibility to fulfil it.1 Among the scholars who have touched upon it, Onora 
O’Neill (1998) and Jeanine Grenberg (2005) argue that Kant’s fundamental duty of 
self-knowledge is never fully attainable due to the wide limitations in knowing oneself.2 
Against this sceptical trend, Owen Ware (2009) and Emer O’Hagan (2009) maintain that 
it is possible to perform the duty of self-knowledge despite a restricted epistemic access 
into oneself. Ware (2009: 690-697) argues that Kant’s duty of self-knowledge refers to 
the possibility of evaluating one’s moral progress using conscience. O’Hagan (2009: 533-
534), on the other hand, argues that Kant’s moral self-knowledge refers to the descriptive 
understanding of one’s moral condition in comparison with the moral law.
Against this background, in what follows, I show that Kant’s duty of self-knowledge 
involves the pursuit of knowledge of oneself as one appears in the empirical world. I 
arrive at this interpretation by recognizing that Kant, not only allots a positive space for 
the possibility of empirical self-knowledge, but also considers it to be morally signifi-
cant. Given the lack of any other way to perform the duty of self-knowledge, the moral 
relevance of pursuing the knowledge of oneself as one appears resolves the issue at hand. 
In the two sections that follow, I introduce Kant’s duty of self-knowledge and discuss the 
difficulty to perform it. Then, I critically assess Ware’s and O’Hagan’s attempts to resolve 
the problem of moral self-knowledge. Following this, I show that, although it is impossible 
to know oneself as one is, Kant’s discipline of empirical anthropology allows us to know 
oneself as an individual and as a member of human species. In the next section, I show 
that pursuit of self-knowledge from within empirical anthropology is reliable enough to 
guard against self-deception and, in addition, Kant considers it to have a moral relevance 
1  Owen Ware (2009: 675, 9fn) rightly notes that the tension between the duty of self-knowledge and the im-
possibility to know oneself “often remains a peripheral issue in the philosophical literature.” Few scholars who have 
touched on Kant’s duty of self-knowledge in their works include Jeanine Grenberg (2005: 217-241), Paul Guyer 
(2000: 384-385), Allen Wood (1999: 196-202), Nancy Sherman (1993: 55-59), Brian Jacobs (2003: 110-111) and 
Onora O’Neill (1998). Owen Ware (2009: 671-698) and Emer O’Hagan (2009: 525-537) have devoted a paper each 
discussing Kant’s duty of self-knowledge in its entirety.
2  O’Neill (1998: 94-97) argues that it is not only impossible to acquire self-knowledge, but it is also practically 
irrelevant for moral living. Although Grenberg (2005: 217-241) agrees that pursuing self-knowledge is impossible 
to be carried out as a duty, unlike O’Neill, she insists that our inability to know ourselves brings humility in us to 
make a steady moral progress.
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to human agents. If so, it follows that the duty of self-knowledge solely involves the pur-
suit of knowledge of oneself as one appears in the empirical world. In the last section, 
I briefly explore the possible objects of the pursuit of empirical self-knowledge and the 
moral implications of doing it as a duty.
Pursuit of Self-Knowledge as a Moral Duty
Although Kant did not write anything about moral self-knowledge in his well-known 
treatises like Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and Critique of Practical Rea-
son, one can see a gradual development of this idea from a few hints about its practical 
importance in the lectures of his pre-Critical period to a full-fledged discussion of it as 
a primary duty in his Metaphysics of Morals. In one of his first accounts on moral self-
knowledge composed as lecture notes by Herder in 1762, Kant stresses on the need and 
the importance of judging oneself impartially (V-PP/Herder, AA 27: 43). Such hints about 
the importance of self-knowledge begin to mature into emphases on the pursuit of self-
knowledge as a duty in his Critical period. For instance, in a lecture given in 1784, we 
see Kant saying that the examination of oneself is a primary duty that must be constantly 
pursued. He writes that the “neglect of this does great harm to morality” (V-Mo/Collins, 
AA 27: 348). A year later, the idea of moral self-knowledge and its primacy as a duty 
culminates to its peak as a few explicit claims about it in his Metaphysics of Morals. In 
this book, he goes to the extent of arguing that the duty of self-knowledge is foundational 
to all the other moral duties. 
In elucidating his theory of duties, Kant divides ethical duties into duties to others 
and duties to oneself. He claims that duties to oneself are the source and foundation of 
all the duties to others. They “take first place, and are the most important [duties] of all” 
(V-Mo/Collins, AA 27: 341). This is because every moral duty is a duty to oneself in 
the first place. Any duty to others stems from one’s own rational faculty and is imposed 
upon one’s own conative faculty for it to be performed towards others. That is, duties to 
others are primarily duties that one imposes upon oneself (to perform it to others). Thus, 
unless there are duties to oneself, there cannot be duties to others (MS, AA 6: 417-418). 
After giving priority to duties to oneself over duties to others, he calls the pursuit of self-
knowledge as the first command of all the duties to oneself (MS, AA 6: 441). If the duty 
of self-knowledge is the basis of all the duties to oneself, then it has primacy over all the 
duties to oneself and others. Thus, for Kant, the duty of self-knowledge is fundamental 
to all the moral duties of an agent. This is why, he writes, “Moral cognition of oneself, 
which seeks to penetrate into the depths (the abyss) of one’s heart…is the beginning of all 
human wisdom.” He also notably asserts, “Only the descent into the hell of self-cognition 
can pave the way to godliness.”
In addition to attributing prime importance to the duty of self-knowledge, Kant also 
briefly discusses what is entailed in it. He writes that the duty of knowing oneself has 
nothing to do with the knowledge of one’s natural constitution because naturally inborn 
characteristics and tendencies lack moral worth. Instead, moral worth depends on how an 
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agent employs and directs one’s natural constitution to perform right actions in the practical 
realm. He writes, “This command is “know (scrutinize, fathom) yourself,” not in terms of 
your natural perfection…but rather in terms of your moral perfection in relation to your 
duty.” Self-knowledge, therefore, refers to the knowledge of one’s “heart”, the ground 
of all actions, i.e. one’s moral condition. He then divides moral self-knowledge into two 
types. The first type, substantial self-knowledge refers to the knowledge of one’s moral 
condition “as belonging originally to the substance of a human being”. The second type, 
derived self-knowledge refers to the knowledge of one’s moral condition as an individual 
human agent with acquired tendencies, peculiarities and idiosyncrasies (MS, AA 6: 441).3
Impossibility of Knowing Oneself: A Problem
Let us now turn to a major problem concerning the duty of self-knowledge. Throughout 
his writings, Kant consistently places wide limitations on the knowledge that one could 
have of oneself. He expresses his doubts about the possibility of knowing ourselves as 
human beings very early in his Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens 
published in 1755. He writes, “We are not even properly familiar with what a human 
being actually is, even though consciousness and our senses should inform us about it” 
(NTH, AA 1: 366). Later in his Metaphysics of Morals published in 1785, he again writes 
that “The depths of the human heart are unfathomable” (MS, AA 6: 447). He maintains 
a sceptical position regarding the possibility of knowing oneself consistently throughout 
all his works. If so, the claim that the pursuit of self-knowledge is a foundational moral 
duty appears to be a contradiction.
Kant expresses the difficulty in having epistemic access into oneself as self-opacity and 
self-deception.4 Self-opacity refers to the impossibility of gaining an objective knowledge 
about oneself as one is. This lack of cognitive access into oneself has its origins from 
Kant’s arguments against paralogisms of pure reason expressed in his Critique of Pure 
Reason. For him, arriving at certain knowledge of oneself is always due to a transgres-
sive employment of reason beyond the limits of possible experience. In simple words, 
objective self-knowledge is always beyond the scope of our faculty of reason (KrV, 
A381-382). In the practical context, this lack of epistemic access into oneself means that 
an agent cannot know for sure if she has performed an action because it is the right thing 
to do or because it gives the desired consequences. Kant writes, “The real morality of 
actions (their merit and guilt), even that of our own conduct…remains entirely hidden 
from us” (KrV, A551/B579). That is, one cannot know with any level of certainty if an 
action has been performed to satisfy the requirements of morality or to gratify the needs 
3  Ware (2009) uses the terms “generic self-knowledge” and “particular self-knowledge” to refer to the know-
ledge about oneself as a “substance of a human being” and knowledge of oneself as “derived”.
4  Both Ware (2009) and O’Hagan (2009) recognize these two forms that the problem of self-knowledge takes. 
Ware (2009: 674-675) refers to self-opacity and self-deception as ‘type-1 opacity’ and ‘type-2 opacity’ respectively. 
O’Hagan (2009: 527-529) calls the former as the ‘epistemological problem’ and does not subsume the latter under 
any specific term.
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of sensible inclinations and tendencies. He writes, “it is absolutely impossible by means 
of experience to make out with complete certainty a single case in which the maxim of 
an action otherwise in conformity with duty rested simply on moral grounds and on the 
representation of one’s duty” (GMS, AA 4: 407). Thus, we cannot know our “heart” as 
we can never have a reliable cognition of the maxims underlying our actions “and of their 
purity and stability” (RGV, AA 6: 63).
Self-deception refers to our tendency to attribute false principles and motives to actions 
in order to deliberately show ourselves in a false light. When an agent observes himself, 
he “cannot show himself as he really is; or he dissembles, and does not want to be known 
as he is” (Anth, AA 7: 121). When we make an attempt to know ourselves, “we make 
supposed discoveries of what we ourselves have carried into ourselves” (Anth, AA 7: 
133). On one hand, we could deceive ourselves by attributing moral principles and good 
motives to our actions in order to appear to ourselves in good light and to avoid moral 
blame (GMS, AA 4: 407). Kant observes that “one is never more easily deceived than in 
what promotes a good opinion of oneself” (RGV, AA 6: 68). On the other hand, we could 
deceive ourselves by attributing immoral principles and evil motives to our actions out of 
self-loathing and self-contempt.5 Thus, it is impossible to know if our actions are driven 
by the demands to do what is right or by our needs stemming from our sensible nature.
Given these two forms of hindrances to self-knowledge, it would be a contradiction 
to ascribe primacy to the duty of self-knowledge. That is, Kant cannot argue that the 
pursuit of self-knowledge is the first command of all the moral duties and, at the same 
time, maintain that it is strictly impossible to know oneself.
Assessing Two Proposed Solutions to the Problem
As mentioned earlier, most scholars of Kant have given only peripheral importance to 
Kant’s duty of self-knowledge. Among a handful of scholars who have paid attention to 
the problem of moral self-knowledge, Owen Ware (2009) and Emer O’Hagan (2009) stand 
out in their elaborate attempts to resolve it. In this section, I argue that their solutions to 
the problem of moral self-knowledge have shortcomings and are far from resolving it.
Ware (2009) interprets Kant’s duty of self-knowledge as involving a comparative as-
sessment of one’s moral restoration in time using conscience. That is, it entails “assessing 
the perceived difference between my old and new ways of life” and then “condemning or 
acquitting me in my effort (or lack of effort) to examine this difference diligently” with the 
help of my conscience (Ware 2009: 696). Although Ware backs his position using Kant’s 
claims, as a solution to the problem of moral self-knowledge, it falls prey to the threat 
of self-deception that he seeks to avoid in the first place. This is because Ware (2009: 
694) argues that the ground of the verdicts of our conscience lies in belief and convic-
5  O’Hagan (2009:528) identifies this form of self-deception as equally important and rightly notes that Kant is 
“overly concerned with our capacity to see ourselves in a good light” and misses out the moral confusion caused due 
to self-loathing and self-contempt.
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tion rather than in knowledge and certainty. If this is so, how could we guarantee that, in 
carrying out our duty of self-knowledge, our ‘inner judge’ would not cast us in a positive 
light due to excessive self-love? Besides, if the basis of our conscience lies in a belief 
about ourselves, the obligation to evaluate one’s actions and life in time would be a duty 
concerning one’s conviction rather than a duty concerning one’s knowledge about oneself. 
In fact, Kant (MS, AA 6: 437-440) briefly discusses a duty to serve as one’s own innate 
judge (conscience) as another moral duty in its own right and does not subsume it under 
the duty of self-knowledge. Furthermore, since one’s conscience is one’s own, Ware’s 
position fails to explain how evaluating oneself with the aid of conscience will provide 
the knowledge of oneself as a member of human species (substantial self-knowledge). 
Finally, it is hard to explain, with Ware’s solution to the problem of moral self-knowledge, 
how an evaluative assessment of one’s moral restoration would improve our performance 
of right actions and enable us to lead morally better lives. This is crucial because Kant 
(MS, AA 6: 441) clearly considers the moral cognition of oneself to have a functional role 
in our moral improvement by dispelling the “fanatical contempt for oneself as a human 
being” and counteracting our individual “egotistical self-esteem”.
Unlike Ware who interprets moral self-knowledge as an evaluation of one’s moral 
progress in time, O’Hagan (2009) looks at it as a descriptive knowledge of oneself in the 
light of the requirements of duty. He (2009: 534) claims that Kant’s duty of self-knowledge 
entails “coming to know what one is like in comparison with the moral law”. For him, 
the point of this duty “is to develop objectivity and to bring the will into line with what 
respect for rational autonomy requires.” Although O’Hagan is right in attributing moral 
significance to it, the act of judging oneself against the moral law cannot be considered to 
be the same as fulfilling the duty of self-knowledge. This is because, for Kant, comparing 
oneself with the moral law is a part of the process of performing any moral action. He 
(KpV, AA 5: 74) writes that when moral law becomes the determining ground of an agent’s 
will, “he compares with it the sensible propensity of his nature”. Such a comparison of 
one’s own constitution against the moral law leads to a negative feeling of humiliation 
about oneself and a positive feeling of respect towards the moral law. By eliciting these 
two feelings (together referred to as ‘moral feeling’) in an agent, the moral law serves as 
an incentive to enable the performance of moral actions (KpV, AA 5: 75-76). Thus, the 
act of comparing one’s moral constitution with the moral law is not a standalone duty, but 
belongs to the process of performing actions in accordance with the moral law. In fact, 
Kant (MS, AA 6: 441-442) explicitly writes that the act of “appraising oneself in com-
parison with the law” follows “from this first command to cognize oneself.” This means 
that carrying out the duty of self-knowledge aids an agent to judge oneself impartially 
against the moral law during the process of performing moral actions. Hence, O’Hagan 
is mistaken in identifying the act of comparing one’s moral constitution against the moral 
law as the duty of self-knowledge.
Thus, attempts to provide solutions to the problem of moral self-knowledge by Ware 
and O’Hagan suffer from difficulties. Hence, there is a need to provide an alternate solution 
that will defend the possibility of pursuing self-knowledge as a duty without disregarding 
Kant’s stance on the difficulties in knowing oneself as one is.
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Possibility of Self-Knowledge via Empirical Anthropology
In this section, I argue that one way to resolve the contradiction between the moral self-
knowledge and the impossibility of it is to look at the duty of self-knowledge as involving 
a pursuit of knowledge of oneself as an individual human agent and as a member of human 
species in the empirical world. Despite severe restrictions to objective self-knowledge, 
Kant leaves room for one’s appearances in the empirical world to be possible objects of 
knowledge from a third-person’s perspective. That is, although knowledge of oneself as 
one is is impossible to attain, knowledge of oneself as one appears in the inner sense and 
in the external world is attainable.6 Kant assures the possibility of acquiring certain and 
predictable (substantial and derived) knowledge of ourselves as we appear in the empiri-
cal world throughout his published works. For instance, in his Critique of Pure Reason 
he writes that, with investigations into agents’ appearances in the empirical world, “there 
would be no human action that we could not predict with certainty, and recognize as nec-
essary given its preceding conditions” (KrV, A549-550/B577-578). Again in his Critique 
of Practical Reason, he writes that with an empirical understanding of an agent’s “cast of 
mind, as shown by inner as well as outer actions”, “we could calculate a human being’s 
conduct for the future with as much certainty as a lunar or solar eclipse” (KpV, AA 5: 99).
Interestingly, Kant subsumes the process of acquiring knowledge of oneself as one 
appears under a systematic empirical study of human self called empirical anthropology.7 
Empirical anthropology is study of human agents “through experience, which in part 
happens internally in myself, or externally, where I perceive other natures, and cognize 
according to the analogy that they have with me” (V-Met-L1/Pölitz, AA 28: 224). It em-
ploys different methods of knowing ourselves (individually and collectively) as we appear 
in the practical realm in order to arrive at a body of knowledge about human beings in 
general. One can arrive at an empirical knowledge of oneself as an individual human agent 
(derived self-knowledge) through introspection followed by reflection. Introspection refers 
to observing one’s psychological states inwardly to know what is driving us to perform 
certain actions. The reflection that follows introspection involves a cross examination of 
the psychological states of our past actions with their rightfulness over time (V-MS/Vigil, 
AA 27: 608). One can also empirically know oneself individually through inference. By 
inference, one can arrive at the knowledge of principles and fundamental dispositions 
underlying one’s actions in the practical realm (RGV, AA 6: 68). Derived self-knowledge 
6  Faculty of sensibility, through which we begin to know things as they appear, is divided into outer sense and 
inner sense. Outer sense refers to the five external sense organs and their property of receiving representations in 
space (Anth, AA 7: 153-154; KrV, A22/B37). Inner sense refers to the “soul” (or mind) and its property of receiving 
representations in time (Anth, AA 7: 161; KrV, A31/B46). Kant argues that, just as objects affect our outer sense for 
the knowledge of their appearances to be possible, we affect ourselves inwardly by means of our inner sense and 
acquire knowledge of ourselves as we appear (KrV, B156).
7  Although he often uses ‘empirical psychology’ and ‘empirical anthropology’ to refer to the empirical study 
of individual human agents (i.e. derived self-knowledge) and the general empirical study of human species (i.e. 
substantial self-knowledge) respectively, in Collins’ and Parow’s lecture notes we see that the subject matter of 
psychology is not different from what anthropology studies. Both are empirical studies on human self in general 
(V-Anth/Collins, AA 25: 8; V-Anth/Parow, AA 25: 243).
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through introspection and inference can serve as a basis for arriving at knowledge of oneself 
as a member of human species (substantial self-knowledge). Substantial self-knowledge 
can be acquired by observations of others in accordance with the content provided by inner 
sense, outer sense and social interactions. This knowledge about oneself as a member of 
human species can further be enriched by other sources like history, novels, biographies, 
travel literature etc. (Anth, AA 7: 120-121; V-Anth/Pillau, AA 25: 734). This observa-
tion must be accompanied by reflection to systematise knowledge about human beings in 
general. About the general method of acquiring empirical self-knowledge, Kant writes, 
“it is advisable and even necessary to begin with observed appearances in oneself, and 
then to progress above all to the assertion of certain propositions that concern human 
nature” (Anth, AA 7: 143).
Given these considerations, it would not be wrong to associate Kant’s duty of self-
knowledge with the empirical knowledge of the derived and substantial human self that 
can be acquired using the methods of Kant’s empirical anthropology. That is, the only way 
out of Kant’s restriction to have an objective knowledge of oneself is to pursue knowledge 
of oneself as one appears using the means suggested by empirical anthropology. Although 
there are no clear-cut claims of Kant establishing this connection, in a lecture in 1793 as 
recorded by his student Vigilantius, Kant hints that the duty of self-knowledge “consists 
in examination of our past state” (introspection) and “comparison of our actions with 
their dutifulness, insofar as we fulfil or transgress the same” (inference) (V-MS/Vigil, AA 
27: 608). Thus, Kant’s moral self-knowledge can be considered as a process of acquiring 
empirical knowledge of oneself as an individual and as a member of human species from 
within empirical anthropology.
Defending the Moral Value of Empirical Self-Knowledge  
against Objections
The idea of resolving the problem of moral self-knowledge using the possibility of acquir-
ing empirical self-knowledge has been criticized by a few scholars of Kant. A readily ap-
parent objection to such an idea is that although the method of introspection and inference 
could break the barriers of self-opacity, it is still tied with the problem of self-deception. 
That is, during the process of knowing oneself via introspection and inference one could 
show oneself in a positive light out of vanity or in a negative light out of self-loathing. In 
other words, empirical self-knowledge could involve ascription of false reasons for acting 
in particular ways due to self-illusion and moral confusion (O’Neill 1998: 93; Ware 2009: 
674, 5fn). Another objection levelled against inferential self-knowledge is that, even if 
one gets a picture of one’s moral character by inferring it from a set of actions over time, 
there is no guarantee that the same set of actions would be performed in the future to 
maintain the same character of the agent (Ware 2009: 687). In other words, it is hard to 
attribute consistency to the knowledge that one acquires about one’s appearances in time.
These two objections raised against the process of acquiring empirical self-knowledge 
are actually manifestations of a serious issue concerning the lack of reliability of empirical 
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self-knowledge (O’Neill 1998: 90; Ware 2009: 674, 7fn; O’Hagan 2009: 527). Unreliability 
of empirical self-knowledge is due to the lack of a priori reasoning within the methodology 
of empirical anthropology. In other words, since Kant’s discipline of empirical anthropo- 
logy investigates the subject matter that experience gives us (i.e. knowledge about oneself 
as one appears in the empirical world), the knowledge that it produces always lacks strict 
universality and objective necessity. Kant writes that experience “tells us, to be sure, what 
is, but never that it must necessarily be thus and not otherwise. For that very reason it 
gives us no true universality…” (KrV, A1). Since strict universality and objective neces-
sity are significant attributes of sciences based on a priori reasoning, the study of human 
self (derived and substantial empirical self-knowledge) loses its status of science. Kant 
himself writes that “the empirical doctrine of the soul can never become…a science of 
the soul, nor even, indeed, an experimental psychological doctrine” (MAN, AA 4: 471; 
cf. EEKU, AA 20: 238). Since the significance of Kant’s general account of scientific 
knowledge lies in the ascription of strict universality and objective necessity (as criteria of 
validity and reliability) (KrV, B4), the very undertaking of the pursuit of self-knowledge 
through empirical anthropology seems useless. Thus, the lack of scientific status to the 
knowledge of oneself through empirical anthropology means that it is unreliable to carry 
out the pursuit of empirical self-knowledge as a moral duty.8
Now, despite a lack of strictly scientific status to it, I defend that idea that Kant’s 
fundamental duty of self-knowledge entails the process of knowing one’s appearances 
using the methods of empirical anthropology. This is primarily because Kant considers 
the empirical study of substantial and derived human self to have some reliability and, 
most importantly, moral significance to the agents undertaking it.
To begin with, the lack of strictly universal and necessary status does not preclude 
empirical anthropology from arriving at any certain knowledge at all. As opposed to strict 
universality and objective necessity, Kant also writes about comparative universality and 
subjective necessity as characteristics of knowledge arriving from experience. For him, one 
can arrive at comparative universality inductively by arbitrarily extending the applicability 
of something in many cases to its applicability to all the cases (KrV, B3-4, A91/B124). 
Subjective necessity refers to the necessary connection of empirical representations arising 
“from frequent association in experience” (KrV, A95/B127). Hence, Kant clearly does not 
neglect the possibility of acquiring knowledge of oneself from within empirical anthropo- 
logy with these two characteristics. Undoubtedly, he understates the epistemic value of 
comparative universality and subjective necessity in comparison with strict universality 
and objective necessity. Yet, empirical self-knowledge with comparative universality 
and subjective necessity surely has better stability, consistency and reliability than self-
knowledge from belief or insights.9 Further, the process of reflection, which essentially 
follows introspection and inference in empirical anthropology, strengthens the reliability 
8  This is why Ware (2009: 678) writes, “…it is vacuous to place me under obligation to know something that 
by virtue of experience I know or will know easily enough.”
9  Hence, the idea of pursuing empirical self-knowledge as a moral duty is a better solution to the problem of 
moral self-knowledge than Ware’s (2009: 694) solution involving conscience, the foundation of which lies in belief.
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of empirical self-knowledge by “quieting” deceiving tendencies and “avoiding errors” 
(V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24: 163). Thus, the pursuit of self-knowledge when undertaken as a 
duty from within empirical anthropology can largely avoid the problem of self-deception.
Next, there is textual evidence for arguing that Kant would have attributed moral sig-
nificance to the pursuit of empirical self-knowledge. In his Metaphysics of Morals, Kant 
briefly writes about moral anthropology as a systematic study of empirical resources that 
help (or hinder) human agents in acting on moral principles (MS, AA 6: 217). He considers 
it as uniting the study of morality with empirical knowledge about human self for better 
equipping human agents towards moral living (V-Anth/Fried, AA 25: 471-472). Thus, 
this discipline is founded on the presumption that empirical resources have moral value 
in assisting human agents to lead good lives. Given this, from a moral anthropological 
perspective, enquiries into oneself as an individual human agent and as a member of hu-
man species in the empirical world have moral significance to human agents. This is why 
Kant considers investigations within empirical anthropology to have moral relevance to 
ordinary human agents. He always made his lectures on anthropology unscholarly, popular 
and informal in order to appeal to the ordinary people. For him, empirical anthropology 
aims to be “useful not merely for the school but rather for life and through which the 
accomplished apprentice is introduced to the stage of his destiny namely, the world” 
(VvRM, AA 2: 443). Thus, for Kant, investigations into oneself from within empirical 
anthropology are morally significant from the viewpoint of his moral anthropology. If 
so, given Kant’s strict restrictions to carry out the duty of self-knowledge otherwise, it is 
only logical to argue that the moral duty of self-knowledge exclusively entails the pursuit 
of empirical self-knowledge.
The Duty of Empirical Self-Knowledge: Contents and Implications
Let us now turn to explore the contents of the moral duty of empirical investigation into 
oneself as an individual and as a member of human species. As mentioned before, the derived 
knowledge of oneself as an individual human agent in an empirical world is to be acquired 
by introspection and inference, followed by a reflection. This examination of one’s own 
idiosyncratic moral condition involves an analysis of one’s own moral disposition, general 
character and practical faculties (cognitive, affective and conative). First, knowing about 
one’s own moral disposition involves attribution of a moral value to one’s choice of maxims 
in the practical realm. For instance, upon self-examination an agent may realize her own 
tendency to adopt moral maxims and, yet, fail to act on them.10 This shows a weakness in 
her moral conviction as a result of her disposition towards evil. Second, knowledge about 
one’s general character refers to awareness about one’s consistency in wilfully acting ac-
cording to principles (Anth, AA 7: 285). For instance, when an agent infers her character 
from her actions, she may realize that she acts impulsively at times. Third, knowing about 
10 This is Kant’s case of frailty. He defines frailty as “the general weakness of the human heart in complying with 
the adopted maxims”. “What I would, that I do not!” represents a frail will (RGV, AA 6: 29-30).
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one’s own practical faculties involves inferring the strengths and defects of one’s cognitive, 
affective and conative capacities. For instance, when carrying out the duty of self-knowledge, 
an agent may realize that she often gets consumed by intense feelings (such as anger, fright, 
enthusiasm etc.) without any space for reflection.11 Next, as we saw earlier, the knowledge 
of oneself as a member of human species is to be acquired by a careful observation of 
other human beings, followed by a reflection. An investigation into the moral condition 
of human beings in general results in the knowledge of certain predispositions and moral 
proclivities that are common to all the human agents in the practical realm. For instance, 
upon an empirical investigation about human nature, one may arrive at the knowledge of 
evil propensity that is inherent in human agents. This is because evil propensity in human 
agents can be demonstrated by “the multitude of woeful examples that the experience of 
human deeds parades before us” (RGV, AA 6: 32-33).
The pursuit of empirical self-knowledge as a moral duty is essential for a better per-
formance of other moral duties and, ultimately, for a better moral living. The knowledge 
we acquire about ourselves individually and as a member of human species prepares us 
to perform right actions and lead good lives. Pursuit of empirical knowledge of oneself 
as an individual human agent leads to an awareness of the morally aiding and hindering 
aspects of one’s own beliefs, emotions, desires, character and disposition. With such 
awareness, an agent can draw advantages from the aids and overcome hindrances of her 
moral condition to satisfy the other requirements of morality. For instance, if an agent 
knows that she has a tendency to get carried away by her need for pleasure, then she can 
work on cultivating and strengthening the feeling of respect for moral law to avoid trans-
gressions from acting morally (MS, AA 6: 399). Similarly, if an agent realizes that she 
does not consistently act on principles, then she can work on developing a character to 
perform moral actions. Likewise, pursuit of empirical knowledge of oneself as a member 
of human species leads to an awareness of the morally aiding and hindering aspects of the 
general moral condition common to all human agents. This awareness paves way for the 
agents to make use of the aids and overcome hindrances for gradually improving one’s 
moral condition as a human agent. For instance, empirical observation and reflection on 
our evil actions would result in an understanding about our natural propensity to evil 
(RGV, AA 6: 26-29). With an awareness of our evil nature, we could put conscious efforts 
to strengthen our good will and weaken the force of evil within us in order to reform our 
general moral attitude (RGV, AA 6: 47).
Conclusion
I have shown in this paper that the only way to interpret Kant’s duty of self-knowledge is 
to look at it as a pursuit of knowledge of oneself as one appears in the empirical world. 
Firstly, although he does not attribute a strictly scientific status to it, Kant allows space for 
11 This is Kant’s case of affects. Along with passions, affects are “illnesses of mind” that negatively influences 
the way we act in the moral realm. (Anth, AA 7: 251; V-Anth/Fried, AA 25: 589).
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knowing oneself as one appears through methods of empirical anthropology. Secondly, 
from Kant’s moral anthropological perspective, knowledge of oneself as one appears can 
be considered as an empirical resource that aids an agent’s moral living. Since there is no 
other way to know oneself, I have argued that Kant’s fundamental duty of self-knowledge 
refers to the pursuit of empirical self-knowledge.
This interpretation of Kant’s moral self-knowledge can be seen in the light of a broader 
discourse on empirically informed ethics. In a prominent review of fin de siècle ethics, 
Darwall et al. (1992: 189) urge that an “infusion of a more empirically informed under-
standing of psychology, anthropology, or history must hurry” for any real revolution to 
happen in ethics.12 From within Kant scholarship, I situate this paper amidst the recent 
trend in the study of empirical influences that are morally important to human agents from 
a moral anthropological perspective. Robert B. Louden (2003), a proponent of this trend, 
discusses general empirical influences like education, law, art, culture and religious com-
munity. Another scholar, Patrick Frierson (2003) discusses specific empirical influences 
like politeness, affects, passions and character. My view regarding the moral implications 
of pursuing empirical self-knowledge supplements both Louden’s and Frierson’s view. 
Substantial and derived empirical self-knowledge can be added to their list of morally 
relevant empirical influences from a moral anthropological perspective. Further work can 
be done on how empirical knowledge about oneself permeates into our practical realm to 
assist us in doing right actions and lead good lives.
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